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OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY



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
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OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY,

SUCCINCTLY PRESENTED.

WITH

ILLUSTRATIONS AND A CHART.

TOGETHER WITH AN

ALLEGORICAL ILLUSTRATION

OF THE WHOLE.

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57431

Wm. Waugh Smith.

“Know thyself.”

CHAUTAQUA ASSEMBLY.

1884.



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AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

IN the general plan and in the divisions adopted in this outline, the author has followed chiefly the "Psychology" of Rev. O. S. Munsell, D.D., published by D. Appleton & Co., New York, of which work free use has also been made in other ways, especially under the head of the Sensibilities.

I must content myself with a general acknowledgment of incalculable obligation to the master-workers of the past in this department, for it would be impossible, and profitless, if possible, to refer to their original sources, thoughts, illustrations, and perhaps even felicitous expressions, which have been absorbed into the mind from many writers and are now given out again unconsciously as its own.

Novelty has neither been sought nor avoided. The object has been to present for those who may possibly pursue the subject no further a systematic outline

of the science of Psychology with a few applications of practical importance, and this end the author has sought by the most direct and effective methods at his command. Profuseness of illustration throughout, summaries of each chapter, and an outline chart of the whole, together with an allegorical recapitulation designed to imprint by its picturesque form what might be otherwise less easily retained by younger readers, constitute the chief peculiarities of the work, and will, it is hoped, contribute to its usefulness.

The author can only hope that he may have sufficiently succeeded in his effort after naturalness of method, clearness of statement, and aptness of illustration to convey to the intelligent reader, though not an adequate, at least a reasonably clear and distinct, idea of the subject.

THE AUTHOR.

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OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

EVERY BODY has a soul. It thinks and feels and decides. It dwells in the body, and through it expresses its thoughts and works, its purposes, yet it is utterly unlike the body which it inhabits. It is invisible. No surgeon's scalpel has ever laid it bare, no microscope has ever disclosed its hiding place. It is imponderable. It causes not the most delicate balance to turn "in the estimation of a hair." The body active with energy, the eye beaming with intelligence, reveal the presence of the soul within, yet that body weighs just so much and no more nor less, when it lies still, with the dull eye and nerveless arm of death.

It is indestructible by man. Whatever He who made man "a living soul" may do, of men He declares they can "kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." Its power extends far beyond the narrow confines of its home. It revisits at will the scenes of the past, and peoples the future with images of beauty which "eye hath not seen nor ear heard." It roams earth, sea, and sky, and enriches itself with treasures of knowledge and wisdom.

Though in the body which we see and touch, it is not of it, and when death brings the summons, "then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." Yet all that the soul can do in the material world around us must be wrought through the meager one hundred and fifty pounds more or less of perishable clay man calls his body. This body has not the strength of the

ox, the speed of the horse, nor is it armed with the tusks or teeth or claws of the fierce beasts around it; it is without wings to cleave the air, or fins to pursue the paths of the sea; yet the imperial soul within proclaims itself lord of earth and sea and air, and bids the body go forth to their conquest, and make flesh, fish, and fowl obedient to its mandates. And truly what wonders hath it wrought! The massive elephant, the sturdy ox, the fiery horse, are subdued and guided by its hand. The whale succumbs to its prowess, the wild beasts and birds flee from or fall before its skill. Even the elements are yoked to its triumphal car, and winds and tides waft it over every sea, fire and water bear it over every continent, or turn for it the busy wheels of countless factories throbbing with seeming life and eager haste to minister to its pleasure. Earth to its toil yields up its stores of food, or, disemboweled, is robbed of its treasured ore and fuel, and the tamed lightning bears the messages of its master.

Yes, man is master. He surveys a world of matter conquered by his feeble body because directed by a mighty soul. Truly, there is nothing great in the world but man, and there is nothing great in man but soul.

The soul is an entity, a substance possessed of attributes. It is not a mere influence. It is utterly distinct from matter, both in essence and in attributes. Soul is a unit; matter is divisible. Soul is essentially active; matter essentially passive. Nor are soul and matter to be viewed as different species of some higher genus. We cannot too firmly fix in our minds this fundamental distinction: soul and body, mind and matter, are two and inconfusable now and forever.

The soul is the "self," the "I," the personality whence all our thoughts and actions spring. "Know thyself" means pre-eminently, know thy *soul*.

How can an immaterial entity dwell in my body and direct it? how can mind come in contact with muscle and control it? are questions which any can ask and none can

answer. This mystery of our being is one of ten thousand which encompass man on every side and show him that his mind is finite, that it cannot comprehend all things, but must learn to live by faith. By faith he plants the hard, dry, shriveled pea, and there comes up, he knows not how, the luxuriant vine to yield its multiplied fruit. By faith he arranges copper and zinc and acid, and there is born, he cannot say how, the subtle force which speaks his will through the interposing ocean to the eastern world. And so *how* soul can move matter or be reached through matter the oldest sage cannot tell; but that soul *does* move matter and that it is reached through it, that at my will my finger guides the pen and that my thoughts are being expressed to you through the medium of your eyes, the youngest child who reads this clearly knows.

What are the powers and processes of the soul within? How do we think and feel and will? These are the questions which Psychology undertakes to answer. Your textbook is your own mind; your apparatus the power which God has given you to know your own thoughts. Let us together enter this inner world, and for a short time study ourselves. For a while let us turn from the contemplation of what has been wrought in the world to see what that wondrous power is which, through such a feeble body, has done so much.

We define, then:

1. *Psychology* (from the Greek *psyche*, the soul, and *logos*, a science) is the science which treats of the phenomena of the embodied human soul.

2. The *soul* is that which thinks and feels and wills, the immaterial part of the natural man.*

* The word "natural" precludes the necessity of making the distinction which the author conceives to exist between soul and spirit, a distinction which could not be utilized in this introductory outline. See 1 Cor. ii, 14, 15.


CHAPTER II.

THE TABERNACLE OF THE FLESH.


THE entire structure of the human body, with its wondrous mechanism, as fully set forth in works on Physiology, is worthy of the closest study; but it is chiefly the nerve-system through which the soul comes in contact with the external world. This system, centering in the brain and extending to every part of the body, is partially shown in the diagram on p. 11.

Through the nerves represented by these delicate white lines, the soul is kept in instant communication with every member. There is no grumbling tooth nor punctured finger but has its telegraphic nerve-line to bear its signal of inquiry to head-quarters in the brain, from which the soul sends back, through the nerves, its orders to every muscle.

Besides this general office of the nerves to inform the soul of the contact of foreign bodies, and to convey its orders to the muscles, certain of them have other and peculiar duties. Thus one leading from the eye is peculiarly affected when light falls upon it from any object, and will then send to the brain an impulse which the soul knows as "*Color.*" Another from the ear is not affected by light, but receives from motions in the air around it impressions which the soul names "*Sound.*" A third, lining the nostrils, tingles only at the approach of "*Odors;*" while spread out upon the tongue and palate is a fourth which answers but to the impulses we call "*Taste or savor,*" sweet or bitter, etc. Lastly, in the finger tips especially is developed a peculiar sensitiveness to outlines and roughnesses, called the special sense of *Touch.* Through these five lines the soul receives its information about the world around us, and through others leading to each muscle it directs every motion of the body with won-



THE CEREBRO-SPINAL SYSTEM.



derful rapidity and precision. Thus curiously and wondrously is the home of the soul fitted up with appliances adapted to all its needs for pleasure or for conquest.

CHAPTER III.

A LOOK WITHIN.

AMONG the endowments which the Creator has given us is the power of the soul to know its own acts and states. Thus we not only think, but we know that we are thinking, and what the character of our thoughts is. This knowledge, which we call *Consciousness*, is immediate and direct. The soul, as an eye-witness, testifies to its own acts and states, and its testimony is unimpeachable and conclusive. In fact, there can be no other witness of the facts of our soul-life, and hence the whole science of Psychology must be founded upon what Consciousness presents.

Again, it is only of what is actually going on *now* in our souls that we can be truly said to be *conscious*. We may remember past thoughts and feelings, or imagine future ones, but are *conscious* only of those real ones now transpiring in our souls. Moreover, it is only the *actions* of the soul of which we are conscious. Of soul quiescent or inactive we can know nothing, for an inactive soul, if there be such a thing, is not conscious. Hence we say Consciousness gives us only the phenomena and not the essence of the soul; it tells what the soul does, and not what it is.

Let us now exercise this power a while.

We sit in our country home before the blazing fire. The wind howls without, but the embers glow and the logs crackle as the bright-tongued flame darts in and out among them. See the fantastic figures in that mass of coals which has just

fallen on the hearth; does not that one suggest a rugged mountain with a ruined castle on the summit, and can't you see that neat little cottage nestling at the foot? How it reminds me of the dear old cottage we knew in by-gone days, and of John and Mary who lived in it. You recollect it, don't you? What a bright cheery fire their home always had, and how delightful a circle gathered around it. The room was a small one, it is true; well, let me see, I should say about two thirds as large as this one in which we sit, but it was ever so nice and cozy.

"O yes," you reply, "I remember it well; and that funny old friend of theirs who used to amuse us so during our last visit. Mr. —, what was his name? Strange I can't recall it; B, C, D,—no, it was M; it began with an M, I am sure. Martin—Moffett—Murphy—no; strange I've forgotten it. Let me think; Mab—Meb—Mib—Mob—Mub"—and I sit in silence for five minutes while you try to recall the missing name. At length you say, "Well, it's of no use; I give it up; let us turn to something else. Try one of these apples."

Now suppose we bring in review a few of the things which arose in our souls while we were looking into the fire and talking about the distant home which one of the dying embers suggested.

First. We saw around us the room and before us the glowing fire—*things real and present.*

Second. We pictured to our minds a mountain, a castle, and a cottage, and recalled the home and fireside of a distant friend—*things unreal and absent.*

Third. We compared the size of our room with that of the remembered one, and concluded that our own was larger. We had many other convictions also, as that it was a good thing to have a comfortable home and a cozy fire, when we heard the wind whistling around the house.

Now these three processes or operations of our souls, though in other respects different, were alike in that they

all involved *thinking*; so we will call them *Thoughts*, or, more strictly, *Intellections*.

Fourth. We felt warm as the fire blazed up. We enjoyed being together, and we felt a melancholy pleasure in recalling the friends who had once formed a part of our social circle, but whom Providence had severed from us. These soul-movements we call *Feelings or Sensibilities*.

Fifth. During our talk you often moved your hand, and in obedience to your soul's command your tongue formed words; then for five minutes together you bent your mind to the effort to recall a name, and when finally you found the effort fruitless, you bade it give up the search and dismissed the subject. These were quite different from any of the other soul-movements we have noticed. The fire existed before you and you saw it; the faces of your friends had been seen by you and you recalled them; but the motion of your hand or tongue, the effort of your mind to recall the name, started for the first time in your own soul. And when you ceased to try and release your mind from the investigation, you did not *see* a release, you did not *feel* a release, you simply *ordered* it. These commands of the soul we call *Volitions*.

Now, while ten thousand things occur every day in our soul-life, they may all be classed under these three heads: *Intellections*, *Sensibilities*, and *Volitions*.

SUMMARY.

I. Consciousness is the soul's power to know its own acts and states.

II. This knowledge is

{	1. Immediate.
	2. Of the actual only.
	3. Of the present only.
	4. Of the phenomena only, and not the essence.

III. The acts of the soul are

{	1. Intellections.
	2. Sensibilities.
	3. Volitions.

CHAPTER IV.

A SECOND LOOK.

IF we recur to the analysis of our half-hour's soul-life, given in the preceding chapter, we will see that there were three kinds of thoughts classed together under the general name of Intellections. First, there was the apprehension of the room and fire and company really in our presence. These we actually perceived, and we will name them *Percepts*. Secondly, we imagined a castle, a cottage, a distant home, and absent friends. These were not real, present things, but were merely mental images of absent ones. We call them *Concepts*. Thirdly, we made comparisons and came to conclusions. These convictions we will call *Beliefs*. We have, then:

Intellections are	{	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Percepts</i>—of things actual and present. 2. <i>Concepts</i>—of things imaginary or absent. 3. <i>Beliefs</i>—about the relations of things.
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Again our Feelings or Sensibilities were of two clearly discriminated kinds. Some were simply enjoyments, and did not look beyond themselves: as the feeling of warmth, or the gratitude we felt as we realized the comforts we enjoyed, or the sadness or pleasure of remembering old-time friends. Others incited us to do something. Thus our appetite for fruit moved us to partake of the nice apples you set before us, as your hospitable feelings had prompted you to offer them. We say, then:

Sensibilities are	{	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <i>Emotions</i>—feelings which find their end in themselves. 2. <i>Desires</i>—which move us to act.
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Volition needs no division. It is ever the simple free act of the soul by which it determines and orders what shall be done. When you bade your tongue express the thought in your mind, it was an act of your will upon your body—a Volition; when you bade your mind recall the forgotten name, it was an order of your will upon your thinking faculties, your mind. Will is the seat of power in the soul. We can, then, enlarge our analysis thus:

Acts of soul are	{	I. Intellections, which are <table style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;"> 1. Percepts. 2. Concepts. 3. Beliefs. </td> </tr> </table>	{	1. Percepts. 2. Concepts. 3. Beliefs.
{	1. Percepts. 2. Concepts. 3. Beliefs.			
		II. Sensibilities, which are <table style="display: inline-table; vertical-align: middle; margin-left: 10px;"> <tr> <td style="font-size: 2em; vertical-align: middle;">{</td> <td style="vertical-align: middle;"> 1. Emotions. 2. Desires. </td> </tr> </table>	{	1. Emotions. 2. Desires.
{	1. Emotions. 2. Desires.			
		III. Volitions.		

We will now consider each of these, briefly, in order.

CHAPTER V.

INTELLECTIONS—HOW WE THINK—THE FIRST STEP— PERCEPTION.

A GOOD part of what we think we perceive is not actual perception, but inference. Thus we popularly say we see an orange, but the truth is we see but the shape and color of one half of it and mentally supply what is unseen. A skillful artist can paint the same outline and shades of color on a flat surface and make us believe we see an orange, though no orange is there. We think we hear a roaring sound, but we really perceive only the pulsations of our auditory nerve, which we refer to an external noise as the cause. But let that nerve be agitated in any other way, as by quinine, and we will hear the roaring just the same, although

no sound is in the air. The soul actually perceives only the affections of the nervous organism which centers in the brain. These affections, as thus perceived by the mind, are called *Sensations*.

Again, our senses do not give us things, but *attributes*. The mind does not through the eye perceive immediately an orange, but reddish-yellow color bounded and shaded off in a peculiar way. The mind itself supplies the idea of a *thing* to possess these qualities. Perhaps an illustration may make this clearer :

If upon putting on a pair of spectacles, you were to find that while houses and trees and men were as before of different shapes and sizes, they all appeared green in color, you would very quickly be led to suspect that the glasses of your spectacles were green. Or if you look through a kaleidoscope at the broken bits of colored glass in the farther end, and find them always making symmetrical figures, and falling into regular triangles and hexagons however you may turn the instrument, you very naturally conclude that there is something in the construction of the instrument which makes the pieces appear in this orderly array.

Now, when we look out upon the world through our mental apparatus we see colors, shapes, and sizes innumerable ; we hear sounds in infinite variety, perceive odors and savors and sensations of touch beyond computation, yet each of these impressions is perceived by us as coming from a *substance*, existing in *space* and *time*, here and now. However much scenes and sounds may vary, these ideas, Substance, Space, Time, etc., are found in each. Now we never perceive mere substance. What is the substance of a tree apart from those attributes which we perceive and classify—its size, shape, color, etc. ? We never perceive space apart from beings, or time apart from acts. Observe, too, how different are our ideas of Substance and Space and Time from our percepts of colors, sounds, etc. We see a color and feel

that it is accidental, that is, that it might have been different, or it might not have been at all. The mind does not demand its existence. But of substance we say, there *must* be substance to possess attributes; there must be what I call a tree to have the green foliage which I see, something around which the qualities my senses give me can be grouped. So of Space and Time and Cause. It is a demand of my mind, a necessity of my nature, to think of things as being *somewhere*, and of acts as occurring at some *time*, and from some *cause*.

It would seem that just as the kaleidoscope is so constructed with mirroring planes as to cause all objects looked at through it to assume a certain order and system, so our minds have been created by God so that all qualities and actions in the world are viewed as belonging to *things*, existing in *space*, occurring in *time*, and proceeding from a *cause*. Substance, Cause, Space and Time are necessities of our thought. The mind, by its own processes, unites the various sensations of color and shape under the central idea of *thing* which it supplies, and the result is what we call the Perception of the orange.

Perception, then, is *by* the soul and *of* the external world, and has in it two elements, one originating in the external world, the other grounded in the very constitution of our souls. The qualities, such as the color, odor, etc., of a rose, originate without us, are given to us through our senses and constitute the first element of our Percept, *Sensation*. The ideas of a thing as the *Cause* of this sensation, and that it exists *here* and *now*, are supplied by the soul itself, as its way of understanding sensations, and may be called *Intuitive Ideas* or *concepts*. The union of the Sensation and Intuitive Concept constitute the Percept, which is of a *thing*, *here* and *now* before us, possessed of certain *qualities*.

OF SENSATION.

We have said that the pulsation of the optic nerve occasions the sensation we call color, of the auditory nerve that which we call sound. But it is evident that this pulsation is not the sensation itself. The nerves of a sleeper may be caused to pulsate, but he has no sensation of sound, and the most sensitive nerves of one under the influence of chloroform may be torn and lacerated without the slightest feeling of pain. There must be an intelligent and attentive soul to receive and perceive the pulsations.

Again, the physiologist can detect no difference in the composition of the nerve which unites the eye to the brain, and that which leads from the ear; but if the one be irritated in any way it occasions the sensation of color, while the other, though similarly affected, produces the sensation of sound. Thus the same blow on the head will apparently cause the ears to hear a roaring sound and the eyes to see "stars." It seems, then; that Sensation is not purely physical. That the pulsation of the nerve, which is purely physical, must be received and interpreted by the soul, and that too in a way of its own, so that pulsations through different nerves, which would seem exactly alike to an outside observer, mean very different things to the soul. Color, sound, odor, etc., are then the soul's interpretation of the pulsations through the optic, auditory, olfactory, and other nerves.

We say, then, that *Sensation* is the soul's interpretation of nervous pulsations, and that the soul, bringing to the sensations of color, etc. thus produced, the intuitive concepts of Substance, Space, Time, etc., unites the Sensations and Intuitions, and makes our Percept of an orange or other object.

This subject of Perception is confessedly the most difficult point in Psychology, and demands thought and attention for

its mastery. Perhaps the following illustration may be of service :

Suppose a man is lying asleep in a telegraph office. Through the wire from some distant point comes the electric current, and the lever of his instrument moves back and forth, but the sleeper heeds it not. This represents simple *pulsation*, the wire being the nerve and the moving lever being the pulsating brain before it is noticed by the soul. Now suppose the man awakes; he at once becomes conscious of the movement of his instrument. This represents *sensation*, the observance by the soul of the pulsations of the brain, and the interpretation of them into sounds, colors, odors, etc. Now the operator brings to bear his knowledge of the telegraphic signals, and connects these sounds into words and sentences, making a telegraphic message. This knowledge of the sounds and capacity for arranging them in a significant order, which the operator brings to bear in interpreting the signals, represents the Intuitions of Space, Time, Cause, and Substance, which the soul supplies, and its power to unite these Sensations and Intuitions in the complete Percept.

To repeat: The telegraph wire represents the human nerve; the moving lever, the pulsating brain; the awakened operator, the attentive soul; the click as heard, the sensation in the soul; the operator's knowledge and skill brought to bear in constructing an intelligible sentence from these separate sounds, stand for the Soul's Intuitive Concepts of Time, Space, Cause and Substance, and its power to understand sensations; the complete message as understood by the operator represents the complete Percept.

Let us close with an example: A pulsation from my olfactory nerves is suddenly noticed by the soul. Since it comes through that nerve the mind understands it to be an odor. The soul, by the law of its operations, supplies the ideas of *cause* and *substance* and *space*, and thinks of the odor

as being caused by some object outside itself. The eye being cast around transmits an impression through the optic nerve which the mind interprets as "red color." The mind now combines these sensations of odor and color and the intuitions of substance and space in one whole, and reports as before it "a circular foliated red thing, giving out a peculiar sweet odor," and having had experience of similar objects before, to which we have given the common name, "rose," we say, "I see a rose," and the philosophers tell us we have formed a *Percept* of a rose.

SUMMARY.

- | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|
| I. The elements of Perception are | } | 1. Sensations.
2. Intuitive Concepts. |
| II. The processes of Perception are | } | 1. Pulsation, in the
brain.
2. Sensation, in the
soul.
3. Intuitions, from the
soul.
4. Perception, by the
soul. |

CHAPTER VI.

THE SECOND STEP—CONCEPTION.

THE elements of all the knowledge man can obtain of the external world are obtained through Perception, while Consciousness gives us directly the facts of our internal or soul-world. The other mental faculties are employed exclusively in working this material into the thousand forms of

use and beauty which we call our "thoughts," and which we have classified as Concepts and Beliefs.

What are Concepts?

Look at the fire. Now close your eyes and tell me how the fire looked. As you try to do so you bring up before you an *idea* of the fire. You repicture it in your mind just as you remember to have seen it a few moments before. So you image to your mind any objects you have heretofore seen, as a large man or a fine horse. These are Concepts.

Again, you read of the fabled animal, half horse and half man, and your mind, striving to realize the appearance of such a creature, pictures a combination of some man's head on some horse's body. This, though also a concept, is not an exact reproduction of any object actually perceived by you, but a new combination of parts of two percepts. Since these two products, the fire and the centaur as pictured by your mind, are images of things perceived, we will call them Imaginative Concepts.

The imagination has an inexhaustible range in forming these Concepts, since it can arrange the innumerable parts of percepts in infinite combinations. The head of any animal may be imaged on the body of any other; every man seen may be pictured in every situation we have ever experienced, and so on, making Imaginative Concepts in endless variety. There are but two limitations to this process: first, the mind cannot imagine any thing it has never perceived; and, secondly, it cannot combine into one concept contradictory qualities. Thus a person who has never seen a parallelopipedon, could not even try to conceive one until it was described to him as a prism, whose base is a parallelogram, and then—if he understood those terms—his mind would reproduce a prism and a parallelogram which he has seen, and combine the two ideas to make his new concept of a parallelopipedon. The mind, then, cannot conceive things whose elements have never been experienced. Nor can

it combine contradictory qualities in one Concept. It may picture a horse with the head of a man or of any other animal, or with no head at all, but it cannot picture a horse with a head and without a head at the same time. You cannot conceive of two mountains without a valley between them. We say, then, that Imaginative Concepts are based upon previous Percepts and do not need to be of actual, but only of possible, objects, that is, of things which might have been made.

A very important class of Imaginative Concepts take the form of suggestions of future possibilities. Thus the ambitious man forms concepts of himself exercising power and influence; the avaricious man delights to picture himself possessed of great wealth; the philanthropist images himself as the rescuer of his fellow-men from want and suffering. Concepts of this kind are formed whenever we are called upon to decide upon any course of action. The possible alternatives are pictured before us, and the Will decides between them. Thus in the housewife's homely question as to whether she shall have roast beef for dinner, the mind brings up not only the Concept of roasted beef smoking on the table, but also alternative Concepts—as of beef cooked in some other way, or of mutton or other forms of food which might be prepared instead of the roast. With these Concepts and the motives for preferring each before it, the Will decides the question, and the busy arbiter of our culinary fate goes bustling about her preparations. Every choice thus involves at least two competing Concepts.

A second form of the Concept is what we have called Intuitions or Intuitive Concepts in our last chapter. We mean by Intuitive Concepts those which are not reproductions of things without nor derivatives from them, but pure products of the mind, which are necessary to its understanding the facts of experience. These are such as our ideas of

Substance, Cause, Time, Space, etc., which have been mentioned before as elements of Perception. It is true that these may not be realized as existing, or may not actually exist as ideas already formed in the mind before we have any sensation from the world without, or conscious experience of soul-life within, yet these sensations and experiences are not the causes producing Intuitive Concepts, but only the occasions of their manifestation and development. They came forth from the soul itself by the law of its own activity.

Among these Intuitive Concepts we must place the fundamental and elementary ideas of Beauty, Truth, and Right. For there must have been a time in our experience, far back in our infancy doubtless, when we first saw something which we felt was "beautiful." How did we know it was beautiful? Must there not have been in our soul the power to bring forth a standard of its own by which to judge of beauty? So when we first felt a thing to be wrong, or judged it to be right. These standards of beauty, right, etc., have doubtless been greatly developed and improved since then; by the cultivation of the Taste, the education of the Conscience, and the sharpening of the Intellect, you do not today esteem as beautiful, right, or true, things which you once considered so, but you have still your own standard by which you say, "This seems true, beautiful, or right to me." The distinctive feature of these Intuitive Concepts is that they are *universal* and *necessary*. Every one has his ideas of Time, Right, etc., and every one must view actions as occurring in time, and as right or not right.

But from these Imaginative and Intuitive Concepts the Mind goes on to form others of still higher rank and greater value. When you say "man is mortal" you do not recall to my mind by the word "man" any particular individual I have seen, but you cause me to think of a whole class of beings as a class. Though I have never had a percept of a

man who was not of some particular race, complexion, size, etc., yet to receive the thought you express in the sentence "man is mortal," I must cast out of my percepts of the men I have seen all non-essentials, such as race, size and color, and combine in one whole certain ones which we regard as essential elements of man, such as animal life, rationality, etc. When I have thus by abstraction and combination found out and put together these essential elements I have a Concept which I name "man." "Man," then, is a general term which embraces all my Concepts of individual men. Thus also, casting aside as non-essential the length and inclination of the sides of three-sided plane figures, I group under the general term "*triangle*" all that are bounded by three straight lines. These Concepts, "man," "triangle," etc., we call *Logical Concepts*, and by enabling us to think of things in classes they are of inestimable value to man. Without this power of the mind to condense, systematize, and label its knowledge, reasoning and science would be impossible, for the mind would be overwhelmed with an infinity of non-essential circumstances at every step. All our general terms for things, such as "man," "horse," "star," as well as our names for qualities, as "redness," "hardness," etc., represent *Logical Concepts*.

It is seen at once that these cannot be pictured like the *Imaginative Concepts*. You cannot imagine to yourself "man" or "redness," but only some man of definite size or color, or some red thing of a definite shape.

We see, then, that Concepts are of three kinds, *Imaginative*, *Intuitive*, and *Logical*.

MEMORY.

We have seen that our Percepts of things before us are retained by the mind and recalled afterward in the form of *Imaginative Concepts*. Thus the mind retains the impression made by the features of an absent acquaintance, so that

upon occasion you can repicture his form to yourself and describe it to another. This power to retain Percepts we call the faculty of *Memory*.

Percepts are not stored singly by Memory, but are linked together by associations, so that upon recalling one many others often come trooping forth without any volition of ours. This involuntary re-appearance of the past we call Remembrance. Or, again, we may, by an effort of the Will, seek to reproduce some Percept we are conscious of having experienced, as when you try to recall the name of a person you may meet, or endeavor to bring up again scenes of your childhood. The mind travels along the meshes of association, seeking some clew to the missing experience, and following it when found until it brings forth, for Imagination to picture again, the old school-house and the bright faces and merry sounds of the play-ground. This power of voluntary reproduction we call Recollection.

If we picture to ourselves the mind in Perception as a Photographer's Camera, the object lens would represent the external organ, as the eye or ear ; the focused rays would be the pulsation transmitted to the brain ; the sensitive plate the brain itself ; the image formed by the mysterious properties of the collodion, the Percept ; then the dark-room in which the plate is stored for future use would be the Memory ; the attendants who bring forth the plate again to be printed from are Remembrance and Recollection ; the artist who prints the pictures from the plate is Imagination, and the picture so made is an Imaginative Percept.

The power by which the essential features of many individual Percepts are separated from the non-essential and then combined into a whole, forming the Logical Concept, is called the *Synthetic Judgment*. So we say the elements of a full-blown Logical Concept are: 1. Perception ; 2. Memory, (including Retention, Remembrance, and Recollection ;)

3. Imagination ;
4. Synthetic Judgment.

The first furnishes

the material, and the other three unite in the process of the manufacture of the Concept.

Intuitive or Pure Concepts appear in their elementary forms as simple spontaneous products of the soul, and as such do not admit of analysis. Our Concepts of Space, Time, Cause, etc., as we have them now in our maturer years, could be traced back to much simpler forms, and perhaps to their sources, but such investigation is outside the limits of this outline.

SUMMARY.

- | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|---|
| Concepts are: { | I. <i>Imaginative</i> , which can be pictured.
They are : | { | 1. Reproduction of actual Percepts, as of a house we have seen.
2. Recombinations of Percepts, or parts of Percepts, as a Centaur. |
| | II. <i>Intuitive</i> , which are necessary and universal ideas formed in every human mind, as the idea of Substance, Cause, Space, Time, etc. | { | |
| | III. <i>Logical</i> , which are : | { | 1. Derived from Imaginative Concepts, as "house," "man," etc.
2. Derived from Intuitive Concepts, as triangle, a mental idea from our notion of space. |

CHAPTER VII.

THE THIRD STEP—BELIEFS.

WE have shown how logical Concepts are formed singly, as the concept "horse" or "animal" from external percepts of horses and animals, and the concept "triangle" from a modification of our intuitive idea of Space. But we find in our mental products propositions in which two such concepts are united, as the assertion, "horses are animals." The faculty which forms these propositions is called Judgment, and the propositions themselves constitute our Beliefs.

Sometimes the belief results from a direct comparison of the two Concepts constituting its subject and predicate, as in the instance above; but at other times the relations of the Concepts are not so evident, and are only ascertained by comparing each with a common third. Thus we may say: All self-luminous bodies are suns; the stars are self-luminous bodies; therefore the stars are suns. Here the belief that the stars are suns is reached by first identifying self-luminous bodies with suns, and afterward observing that the stars are identical with self-luminous bodies. The first instance—"horses are animals"—is an example of *Immediate* or Direct Judgment, and the last is an illustration of *Mediate* Judgment, or Reasoning.

The mind in this process of Reasoning is guided by uniform and fixed laws. The Judgment cannot exercise the freedom accorded to the Imagination to affirm the *possible*, it must declare only the *actual*, the *real*, as seen by the soul. So we say we *can imagine* this book printed on black paper with white ink, but we *must believe* that it is printed on white paper with black ink. So, too, the Reason must move in

channels marked out for it by the Creator. If you admit that all self-luminous bodies are suns, and that all stars are self-luminous, you *must* believe that all stars are suns. Hence we see the important fact that the soul is not free in forming beliefs, and that convictions are forced upon it by facts when it considers them. You cannot believe what you choose, except as by prejudice you refuse fairly to consider the facts.

An important distinction is yet to be made as to our Beliefs. We say that "the sum of the parts of any thing is equal to the whole," and we also say, "Chautauqua is in New York." Both of these statements express conclusions of which we have not the shadow of a doubt, but the first does more: it expresses not only something which we know *is* true, but which we feel *must* be true, so that we could not conceive of the contrary. Thus we could as truly say, "The sum of the parts of any thing *must* be equal to the whole." This is not the case with the other belief cited. While it is just as true that Chautauqua is in New York, we could not truly say, "Chautauqua *must* be in New York," and we could easily conceive of it as being in another State. Beliefs are, then, 1. Necessary, or, 2. Not necessary. The not-necessary beliefs are derived from our observation and experience, and hence are called Experiential Beliefs. Necessary beliefs are based on the Intuitive Concepts of the mind, and are independent of experience. They are:

1. Logical: as that "the whole is equal to the sum of the parts."
2. Mathematical: as that "two straight lines cannot inclose space."
3. Moral: as that "justice is right."
4. Metaphysical: as that "every event is caused."

We have seen that the processes of the mind in reaching conclusions from premises (as in the example concluding that "the suns are stars") are fixed and certain, and that the

mind cannot knowingly deviate from them. If the premises are true the conclusions must be correct, and we can depend upon the conclusions of all right-minded reasoning to be just as certain as are the premises. Thus, if we can only say, "I *think* the stars are self-luminous," then we could only conclude, "I *think* the suns are stars;" but if we could say, "The stars *must* be self-luminous," and "all self-luminous things *must* be suns," we could then conclude that "the stars *must* be suns."

This remark prepares us to understand the difference in the nature of our belief in the conclusions of Pure Mathematics and those of other Sciences. In Pure Mathematics we reason about purely mental concepts—Number and Space—and use as our premises only *necessary beliefs*. I do not mean to affirm, with the pure Idealist, that there is no Space outside the mind, but that when we reason about a point "which has position but not size," or a line "which has length but no breadth," and of spaces inclosed by such lines, we are talking of things which have no existence outside the human mind. We may draw marks on slate, paper, or blackboard, and call them straight lines, but they are never absolutely straight, and they always have some breadth as well as length. We draw a triangle, as we call it, on the board, and prove that the sum of its three angles *must* equal two right angles; and yet, as a matter of fact, the triangle is inaccurately drawn, and the angles would measure more or less than two right angles. It is evident, then, that the triangle we are arguing about is the theoretical one we have in our mind, and which we merely represent by the figure on the board. Mere ideas, then, of lines, triangles, etc., are created by the mind itself, and are endowed in their creation with certain necessary qualities. We have not found somewhere in the world a straight line with length and no breadth, and by measuring it reached the conclusion that it is "the shortest distance between two points," but

the mind, conceiving two points in space and the most direct route from one to the other, names that "a straight line," and gives the definition, "a straight line is the shortest distance between two points."

Now this proposition, as well as all other definitions and axioms of Mathematics, is not only a belief, but a *necessary* belief; and as every deduction of Pure Mathematics is derived by logical reasoning from these definitions and axioms, all of its conclusions are *necessary* also, and so we not only prove that the sum of the angles of a plane triangle *do* equal two right angles, but that they *must* do so.

But in most other Sciences we do not create our premises, but get them from observation, which gives us not *necessary*, but only *actual*, truths; not what *must be*, but only what *is*. And, however trustworthy our observations may be, our reasoning only leads us to the *true*, not the *necessary*. Hence we cannot prove that the earth *must* attract all other bodies as a matter of necessity, but we can convince any fair mind that it does so, as a matter of fact.

Any science, then, built upon necessary beliefs, will be able to establish its conclusions as *necessary*, and to force them to universal and absolute acceptance; while those which draw their premises from observation can only hope to prove their conclusions *true*, and can only demand of men that they accept what careful observation and rigid criticism have verified. Mathematics itself, so soon as it leaves its world of ideal points and lines and curves to deal with the practical questions of life, as in Surveying, Engineering, and other branches of Applied Mathematics, has to introduce observations about local attraction, strength of timbers, etc., and its conclusions are then no more necessary than those of any other science depending upon observation for its premises.

In this is seen the absurdity of the demand of some that the beliefs of the Christian Religion be demonstrated to

Mathematical conviction; that is, so that no one *can* possibly doubt. For the Science of Theology draws its premises from observation and experience, and depends upon facts revealed to man as truths in the Book of Nature, or the Volume of Revelation. A religion which could be Mathematically demonstrated must, like Pure Mathematics, be evolved wholly from within man himself, and one might well prefer, as a guide through life, the well-authenticated revelations of a perfect God, to the deductions, however *necessary*, of man, a fallen and corrupt being.

The difference between necessary and experiential beliefs is not one of certainty, but of conceivability. In the former it is not possible to conceive the opposite; in the latter we can always conceive the contrary, however firmly we hold to the proposition as stated. We believe that the sum of the angles of a plane triangle is equal to two right angles, and cannot conceive any plane triangle having such sum less or greater. We believe that the Iliad was written by an intelligent being, but it is conceivable that it might have been produced by tossing up the number of Greek letters it contains until they accidentally fell into the order in which they are found in that poem. Yet who will say that he is less certain that the Iliad was the product of intelligent thought, than that the sum of the angles is as stated? So we may conceive that Christ was an enthusiast or an impostor, and that his teachings are wrong and misleading, but the fair-minded man, examining the facts, will not so believe.

The whole process of intellection culminates in Beliefs, or faiths. The Logical Concept was elaborated from the Imaginative, simply that the mind might the more readily use its material in reasoning, and attain convictions. Through Pulsation, Sensation, Intuition, Perception, Retention, Recollection, Logical Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning, all the soul's long search after truth ends here when it says,

“This is thus and so.” In faiths, and faiths only, the mind rests. Man was created to believe.

SUMMARY.

All Beliefs are: 1. Results of Comparison; 2. Immediate or Mediate; 3. Necessary or Experiential, and are, 4. The object and end of Thinking.

CHAPTER VIII.

H O W W E F E E L .

IN Chapter III we detected as the second great division of our soul acts certain ones which we called *Sensibilities*. These include the pains and pleasures, hopes and fears, joys and sorrows; in fact, every motion man experiences in his checkered life. We cannot undertake to enumerate, but only to group and classify them.

If you will take the trouble to turn back to page 16, you will see that we have already divided the Sensibilities into two chief classes:

1. *Emotions*, or those sensibilities which do not call for action, as the sense of awe or of sorrow, or the feeling of comfort or discomfort.

2. *Desires*, which are motives to immediate action, as thirst, curiosity, love, and hatred.

We spoke there of the comfortable feeling of warmth we had as the fire blazed up, the feeling of bright cheerfulness, or of tender melancholy, as we recalled the past, and the sentiment of gratitude to the good Being who had led us so kindly along life's way.

Now, these three represent three classes into which all our Emotions may be divided. The first class, as the feeling of warmth, are purely bodily sensations; that is, they have their

origin in the states of our physical organism. Some are negative, as Weariness, Languor, Discomfort; others positive, as Heat, Pain, Pleasure, and the sense of vital Energy, the feeling that we are well and strong. We call these the Physical Emotions, or *Feelings*.

The emotions of the second class arise partly from bodily, and partly from mental, causes. They are such as Cheerfulness and Melancholy, Interest and Ennui, Anxiety and Indifference. These are the Physio-Psychical Emotions.

The emotions of the third class are purely psychical. They all arise out of some perception of the intellect, and are not dependent upon the states of the body. These are usually more intense, yet less lasting, than the emotions of the other two classes. They are such as:

1. Surprise, Wonder, and Admiration.
2. Disgust, Contempt, and the sense of the Ludicrous.
3. Shame, Sorrow, and Pity.
4. Fear, Horror, and Despair.
5. Emotions excited by the Beautiful, the Sublime, the Awful.
6. Adoration, Love, Joy, and Peace.
7. Moral Approval and Disapproval.

What the nature and characteristic of each of these Emotions is; how, for instance, Surprise differs from Wonder, and what is the line of distinction between the ludicrous and the disgusting, or the exact step from the sublime to the ridiculous; what purpose in the life and development of man each of these serves; as, for example, how important is the feeling we call "Pain," to urge the soul to care for some part of the body which is being injured; how Weariness is the body's cry for rest and sleep; how Cheerfulness and Interest aid the work of life; and what are the uses even of Fear and Horror, Shame and Sorrow in God's great plan for man's development, are questions of interest and importance, but we cannot discuss them here. The reader will find them treated

in Munsell's "Psychology," pp. 196-219, or in any complete and systematic treatise on the Emotions. Enough has been said to indicate the field for exploration, and this is our present purpose.

The second great class of Sensibilities—the *Desires*—can best be subdivided into classes corresponding to the three under which the Emotions were arranged, namely: Physical Desires, or *Appetites*; Physio-Psychical Desires, or *Propensities*; and Psychical Desires, or *Affections*. Besides these there is one other motive to action which is so different from all others, and so important in itself as to require separate consideration. This is the Moral Impulse or *Conscience*.

As a whole, the Desires are demands of our Material and Immaterial natures for some object of gratification suited to each specially, or to the complex whole. They are logically preceded by, and based upon, prior emotions, though often we cannot distinguish any interval of time between the desire and the emotion which, we say, must have come before it. Thus the desire for food is based upon the simple feeling of hunger, the desire for knowledge upon the emotion of wonder, the desire for society upon the emotion of sympathy, the desire to benefit upon the emotion of love, and resentment upon the sense of wrong.

The great part which Desires play in the drama of human development is evident at a glance. The gratification of desires constitutes man's present happiness, and by his desires alone is he stimulated to that exercise of his powers, physical, mental, and moral, which is the condition and the means of their development. For every desire of man God has created a corresponding object able to satisfy it: Food for Hunger, water for Thirst, fellow-beings for our Sociability, truth, beauty, and goodness for our Love, knowledge and power for our Curiosity and Ambition, and heaven for our highest aspirations. Truly, all things seem to be made in pairs,

“the one over 'gainst the other.” The utter decrepitude of man is pictured by the wise man when he says, “And desire shall fail.”

We have seen that Desires are divided into Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. Let us enumerate a few of each class.

1. *Appetites.* These are: (1) Natural, as hunger, thirst, and sexual love; or (2) Acquired, as the craving for opium, alcohol, tobacco, etc.

2. *Propensities.* They are: (1) Selfish, as the desire for self-preservation, self-development, and self-gratification; for knowledge, (Curiosity,) for property, (Acquisitiveness,) or for power, (Ambition;) (2) Social, as the desire for company, (Sociality;) the desire to do like others, (Imitiveness,) which builds the throne of Fashion; the desire of esteem, (Approbativeness;) the desire for superiority, (Emulation;) and the respect for truth, (Veracity,) which forms the foundation of the social fabric, and makes society possible.

3. *Affections.* These are: (1) Malevolent, as Indifference, Hatred, Envy, and Jealousy. (2) Benevolent, as Patriotism, Philanthropy, and Piety, or the Love of Country, of Mankind and of God.

We must here introduce two other of our Sensibilities which we have not before classified or mentioned on account of certain marked peculiarities. They are Hope and Fear. These are certainly in some sort Emotions, and yet in another sense they are motives to action, and hence would seek a place with the Desires. They have not, however, like the true Desires, any specific or peculiar object. Hunger (as a Desire) demands food, Sociability asks for company, Ambition for power; but what one thing does Hope or Fear demand? They appear rather as concomitants and intensifiers of the true desires, so that with every desire we have, there is more or less of hope or fear with regard to its gratification.

SUMMARY.

Sensibilities are :	I. Emotions, which are :	1. Physical, (Feelings,) as Heat.
		2. Physio-Psychical, (Dis- positions,) as Cheer- fulness.
		3. Psychical, (true Emo- tions,) as Terror.
	II. Desires, which are :	1. Physical, (Appetites,) as Thirst.
		2. Physio-Psychical, (Pro- pensities,) as Socia- bility.
		3. Psychical, (Affections,) as Hatred.

CHAPTER IX.

CONSCIENCE.

AMONG the most powerful motives to human action is what we usually call Conscience. A little reflection, however, will show that the term Conscience is popularly used to indicate, not a simple, but a complex faculty of the soul. We say: "My Conscience tells me that lying is wrong; my Conscience troubles me about a certain act; my Conscience demands that I do what I believe to be right." But note how different are these acts which are thus all assigned to one source. The first is a judgment, "lying is wrong;" the second is an emotion, remorse; the third is a demand upon the will that it shall choose the right. Now the judgment, "lying is wrong," is just as much an act of the Reason

as is the decision, "curves are beautiful;" the feeling of a troubled Conscience is just as much an Emotion as the feeling of grief at any loss or mistake. Hence, when we call these acts of Conscience, we make it a faculty for judging, and also a faculty for feeling on moral subjects. But why separate *moral* judgments and emotions from all others, and assign them to a distinct faculty? Certainly, the faculty which says a thing is true or beautiful is the same one which says an act is right or wrong. The processes, too, are the same. If we are in doubt as to the truth of a statement we refer to the authorities and weigh the evidence in the case, and exactly in the same way, if we are in doubt of the right or wrong of an action we refer to the authorities, the opinions of good men, the teachings of the Church, or ultimately the Word of God, and after weighing the evidence we decide just as we did in the other case. Moral decisions, therefore, are not to be treated as made by a special faculty, but simply by the Judgment acting on moral matters. In these decisions it is as liable to err as in others. We err as to what is right and wrong in any given case, just as we err as to what is wise or prudent, because of the infirmity of our Judgment.

Nor is there any thing so peculiar in the Moral Emotions—Remorse at wrong-doing, Approbation at right conduct—that they should require to be credited to a special faculty as their source. Why say, "My *Conscience* is troubled at sin," and, "My *heart* is troubled at sorrow?" The distinction is misleading. The Moral Judgment and Moral Emotion, therefore, need not be specially considered here, but take their places naturally among the Beliefs and Sensibilities already discussed; but the third function of what is popularly termed Conscience is the really peculiar and distinctive one, the one which appears as a motive to action, and this we should treat as the true office of Conscience. This is the direct demand, the Categorical Imperative, which says to the will, "Choose the Right." The relations of Conscience,

in this sense, will be seen to be similar to those of the desires in general. We have seen that every desire is associated with some particular emotion and based upon a prior intellection; thus we perceive a strange sight, feel the emotion of wonder and curiosity; the desire of knowledge is immediately developed, and demands to have the matter explained. So with moral questions. We decide an act to be right, feel a sense of obligation resting upon us, and at once there arises a demand on our wills that we do it. Conscience, then, in the restricted sense in which the term is here used, must rightly take its place beside the Desire class of the Sensibilities, as one of the most powerful motives to Volition, based on prior intellection and accompanied by its appropriate emotion. In one respect, however, Conscience differs from all other motives to action, it is *authoritative* in its demands. Other motives may be *urgent*. This is *imperative*. We shall here, then, consider Conscience as the Moral Impulse, that within us which ever and always demands of every man that he shall do the right as he sees it; not necessarily the absolute right, but the right as it appears to him. If I believe a thing to be right, my Conscience bids me do it, and though afterward new light may convince me that I made a mistake in thinking it right, yet the sense of moral approbation, which arose when I first chose to heed that command of Conscience, still approves my obedience. Believing as I did, I should have acted as I did, though perhaps a charge of willful or unjustifiable ignorance may come against me for not having known better.

This sense of Moral Approbation follows every act of obedience to the one cry of Conscience, "Do the Right." "I have lived in all good Conscience before God until this day," says Paul, though he had persecuted the Church, for he "verily thought with himself that he ought" so to do.

Is Conscience, then, as it has been called, "The voice of God in the soul?" If by Conscience is meant that faculty

of judging moral things which says of any act, "This is right," or "This is wrong," we answer, No; for then the "voice of God" would be found telling Paul at one time to destroy and at another to promote faith in Jesus as the Christ. But if we mean by Conscience, the demand in the soul, springing from the feeling of obligation, that every volition should be in accord with what Reason says is right, we answer, Yes; for God has planted in us this Impulse, which, as a voice crying in the wilderness of man's degradation, demands with divine authority this obedience, and points us upward to a higher and better light. As food is the object of Hunger, as truth is the object of Curiosity, so the Right, as Reason sees it, is the object of the Imperative of Conscience.

Is this impulse of Conscience a true guide to right action? It is not an *infallible* guide. Paul's Conscience urged him to persecute the Church; the Hindu woman's Conscience moves her to cast her child into the Ganges, for she thinks she ought to do it as an act of worship to God. Conscience, then, is not an ultimate standard of right and wrong. "I know nothing against myself; yet am I not hereby justified," says Paul. "He that judgeth me is the Lord." The will of God is, then, the only infallible guide to human action, that and that alone is the ultimate Right. What that will is we must set ourselves to ascertain; our Moral Judgments must be made in accordance with it; our moral acts must be measured by that standard. Herein consists our responsibility for right action, because God gives us power to know his Will if we have the earnest desire to do it.

Conscience is, however, a true guide in its demand that we do the right as we see it. If a thing be wrong to us we must not do it, and those who have not the clear revelation of the divine will which we enjoy, find in Conscience "a law unto themselves." Our errors, when we act according to Conscience, are due to the mistakes of Judgment as to what is right, and for these mistakes we are responsible just so far

as we have power to avoid them, and no further. If "Light is come into the world," and we love darkness rather than light and remain in willful ignorance of the Right, "this is our condemnation." The conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must enlighten our Moral Judgment to the utmost so as to get correct decisions as to the right in every case, and that we must then implicitly obey the Voice of Conscience bidding us do what we have decided to be right, every man for himself.

SUMMARY.

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|---------------------------|---|--|
| Conscience is popularly : | { | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A Faculty for Moral Judgment, asserting, "This act is right." 2. A Faculty for Moral Emotion, "My Conscience troubles me." 3. A Moral Impulse, urging always, "Do the Right." |
|---------------------------|---|--|

Strictly speaking, the third is the true definition. Conscience is a Moral Impulse to action.

It is a true, but not an infallible, guide to man, and demands to be instructed and enlightened to accord with the supreme Right known to us as the Will of God.

CHAPTER X.

VOLITION—HOW WE DETERMINE.

WE now come to consider the last class of Soul Movements, (see p. 15,) the Volitions. These are the product of the sovereign Will of man, which chooses, determines, orders.

Man is an active being. Mind and body are well-nigh every moment doing something under the guidance of the

Reason and at the bidding of the Will. Even our Beliefs, the ultimate object and the end of all our Intellections, are only valuable as they are bases of action. A dead faith that results not in work is naught. Our Sensibilities are, as we have seen, in their highest form, but motives to action, mental and physical. Volition, then, is the supreme movement of the soul.

But the Will is the most important of our faculties, not simply because it directs the energies of both mind and body, but also for the reason that it alone of all our faculties is absolutely *free*. It is in willing that man shows himself as a free personality, and to this freedom attaches moral responsibility and all the tremendous consequences that flow from it.

Our Percepts, the basis and material of our Intellections, come to us from without, and what they shall be is beyond our control. You perceive this book to be of a certain size and shape, and you cannot see it otherwise. You look around you and see not what you would, but what actually exists. We have already seen (page 30) that Beliefs can be forced upon us. We cannot deny the evidences of our senses, nor reject the logical inferences of our reason. We *must* believe that which is proven to our minds.

Nor are our Sensibilities free movements of the soul. We do not feel glad or sorry, bold or fearful, at our own pleasure. We are forced to feel awe or terror in the presence of the tornado or the earthquake, and joy and grief neither come nor flee at our bidding.

Neither Intellections nor Sensibilities, then, are absolutely free. They can be forced upon us. But the choice of the soul, who can force it? Indeed, a forced choice, a necessitated volition, is a contradiction in terms and utterly inconceivable. Here, then, is found that freedom and responsibility of which man is conscious. We ever *choose* for ourselves, and are morally responsible for our choice and its

consequences, and for them alone? This is evident to every man's Consciousness. Ask a man why he perceives the sky as blue, recalls his former home as a two-story cottage, believes in the law of gravity, or the conclusions of geometry, or why he feels sorrow in bereavement, and he will say that he cannot help it; that these things are in accordance with his nature and beyond his control. But ask him why he walks up the street instead of down, or why he chooses a particular course of study, or performs any other act of Will, and he will say, "Because I choose," or "Because it seems best to me," but never will he honestly say, "Because I could not help it," meaning that he could not have chosen otherwise. The language, the laws, and the universal Consciousness of all people testify that man does and *ver* must believe himself free in his volitions and responsible for them. This freedom it is which gives to Volition its peculiar dignity and its exalted position in the soul.

There are four steps leading up to, and culminating in, the act of Volition: 1. Conception of possible acts. 2. Motives for and against the acts proposed. 3. Choice between them. 4. Executive Volition. Let us illustrate them.

Consider what you shall do about this book which you have in your hand. *First*. Imagination conceives of two or more possible actions which your Will might order, as that you might skip this page, or lay the book down, or read on.

Second. As soon as these Concepts are formed, Judgment, at the instigation of Conscience and Reason, passes upon them to decide if they are wrong, profitable, pleasant, etc., comparing them with your mental standard of the right, the useful, the agreeable, etc., and thereupon there arise in the mind motives for and against each proposed course. Indolence or indifference, perhaps, urge you to skip this discussion. Weariness says, lay the book entirely aside, while Curiosity or perhaps Conscience moves you to read on. Emulation or

Ambition may come in to urge you to master the subject, while Hunger or Sociability may call upon you to stop to enjoy the pleasures of the table or of company. A hundred subtle motives may be present, but there are always at least two. No possible action is ever proposed to your Will but that it has a choice between it and some other action, or between it and no action at all; that is, between action and quiescence. And for each of these alternatives there is at least one motive, though it be on the one hand, but the desire for notoriety, which almost always urges us to every vigorous course proposed, or, on the other, the desire for ease, which about as universally opposes all such action. In the present case we will suppose that you are being urged to continue reading by Curiosity, and to desist by Indolence. These two steps, the alternative propositions and the motives for them, are preliminary to the exercise of your Will. They are movements of your Intellect and Sensibilities.

Third. The Will makes a decision in favor of one of the possible actions before it. You choose to read on, and in this act of choice the soul is free. You may or may not have listened impartially to the motives, and it is wrong to say you are governed by the "strongest motive" in making your choice, for a motive has no strength in itself. It is strong if it pleases Will, weak if it does not, and the same motives do not always have the same influence on the same man. Certainly no one with a healthy Will can honestly say that any motive was so strong as to *compel* him to a certain course. You were free in your choice to continue reading, and you are conscious of it.

Fourth. The Will issues its order to the executive officers of the soul to carry its choice into effect. When you decide to continue reading, it orders the muscles of the arm and hand to hold the book before your eyes, or turn the leaf, and it issues its order to the mental powers under its control, bidding the Intellect to concentrate its powers of thought upon

the subject in hand and consider attentively the sentences read.

With this fourth step—Executive Volition—the action of the soul in the case supposed ends. In this, also, it is perfectly free, and even independent of the choice which preceded it. We may choose, but not order the execution of our Volition, may decide to study the subject, and yet not put forth the hand or concentrate the thoughts.

Since both the decisive Volition we call Choice and the Executive Volition are free actions of the Soul, we are consciously responsible for both, and so we feel the justness of the teaching of Scripture that he who chooses the death of his fellow-man, "whosoever hateth his brother," is a murderer in spirit, though he may not put forth his hand against him.

"But, are not motives the causes of choice? Surely we could not choose to do an act for which there was no motive present." True, indeed, we must have a motive for every choice, and always do have two at least present in every choice, for we cannot choose except there be at least two courses open to us, and for each there will be some motive. But there is a wide difference between a thing being a *necessary antecedent* of an act and being a *cause* of it. A true cause is that which has *power to produce*, which *necessitates* a result. All other antecedents, however necessary to the result, are but occasions or conditions of it. The determination of the author to write and of the printer to publish are the only true causes of the existence of this book, and the existence of Psychological truth to be expressed, and of type, paper, ink, etc., whereby to express it, were but the occasion of these volitions. *Only Will has power*, only Will can cause.

In a Court the Judge cannot decide any thing until some member of the bar brings a case before him. His decision is thus occasioned but not determined by the pleading of the lawyer; he decides because the advocate presents a case, but

he decides as he himself sees best. So the human Will, as the autocrat of the soul, cannot decide any thing until Imagination has presented it a case to decide. This it does by drawing a Concept of two possible alternative actions of Will, and these actions are each advocated by motives. Then the Will can and does decide, but the choice is its own.

Yet, free as the Will is, it can bind itself. Its own acts repeated over and over become habits of choice, which, though able to be broken in any case, are rarely so cast aside. Many acts, originally needing a special volition, become so habitual as to be performed without conscious consideration, as the motions of our members in walking, talking, and eating. Thus, also, many important movements of the soul come to be made almost unconsciously. Mighty is habit for good or for evil. Saddest of the sad scenes of earth is the sight of the young man being enwrapped by the meshes of an evil habit, or of the old man bound by its iron chain, while he whose voluntary choice has by constant repetition formed fixed habits of virtue, so that the soul "rests in Providence, moves in Charity, and turns upon the poles of truth," is a spectacle which delights heaven and blesses earth. Like the strong man of old, the human Will, as God sends it forth, is a free and mighty ruler, and cannot be fettered by the new ropes or the green withs of its foes; but it may prove false to its mission, and in the lap of license may barter away its liberty until it finds itself the helpless captive of its foes. Yet even then, if it shall rouse itself again and call upon the great Author of its being, its vigor shall return, and it shall break the bands of its enemies and disappoint their hopes.

In volition man exercises his highest prerogative and manifests his divine origin and likeness. We have already said that only a Will can be a Cause, that only in Will lies true *power*. Men say popularly that the earth has the *power* to

hold the moon in its orbit, or the tornado has power to uproot the oak, but it is not so. They have *necessity*, not power. The earth cannot but attract the moon, the tornado cannot refrain from uprooting the oak. Power can act in different directions, necessity in but one. We repeat, only a free Will can have power and be a cause. God, the great First Cause of all things, has supreme power; and man, created and endowed with a free will is a true cause within his limited sphere, a little god. All nature around him is under the dominion of inexorable law; the stars move in their appointed courses without option of their own; the seasons come and go, the rivers, winds, and tides move restless back and forth; "all things are full of labor" and of change, and yet in all these there is no choice. Like the wheels of a mighty clock they but fulfill the course appointed by their Maker and register his will. Even in man, the laws of life rule inexorably over his body, and the laws of thought and feeling furnish channels for his intellections and emotions. But when the moment of decision comes, the Will steps forth as a sovereign, clothed with autocratic powers, and gives its sentence. Thus is man made in the image of God.

SUMMARY.

The movements of the soul in Volition are:


1. Conception of possible alternative actions.
2. Motives for and against each.
3. Choice, by the Will—free.
4. Executive Volition—free.

The Will is the seat of human power and responsibility, and a true cause in its limited sphere, as God is in his unlimited domain.

OUTLINE SUMMARY.

PSYCHOLOGY
treats of the phenomena
of the soul. These are:

- I. INTELLECTIONS,**
which are of three kinds:
- 1. Percepts,** whose elements are:
 1. Sensations, which are of three classes:
 1. Muscular.
 2. Organic.
 3. Special. These are:
 1. Smell.
 2. Taste.
 3. Hearing.
 4. Sight.
 5. Touch.
 2. Intuitions.
 - 2. Concepts,** which are:
 1. Imaginative.
 2. Intuitive.
 3. Logical.
 The formation of Concepts involves:
 1. Memory.
 2. Imagination.
 3. Synthetic Judgment.
 - 3. Beliefs,** which are of two classes:
 1. Necessary.
 2. Experiential.
- II. SENSIBILITIES,**
which comprise:
- 1. Emotions,**
which are of three kinds:
 1. Physical (Feelings.) These are:
 1. Negative, as Weariness, Weakness, etc.
 2. Positive, as Vitality, Pain, etc.
 2. Physio-psychical (Dispositions.)
 1. Cheerfulness and Melancholy.
 2. Interest and Ennui.
 3. Anxiety and Indifference.
 3. Psychological, (true Emotions.)
These may be classified:
 1. Surprise, Wonder, and Admiration.
 2. Disgust, Contempt, Sense of the Ludicrous.
 3. Shame, Sorrow, Pity.
 4. Fear, Horror, Despair.
 5. Beauty, Sublimity, Reverence.
 6. Joy, Peace, etc.
 - 2. Desires,**
which are of three kinds:
 1. Physical (Appetites.)
 1. Hunger and Thirst.
 2. Sexual Desire.
 3. Desire for Sleep.
 2. Physio-psychical (Propensities,) which are:
 1. Desire for Self-preservation.
 2. Desire for Self-development.
 3. Desire for Self-gratification.
 4. Curiosity.
 5. Acquisitiveness.
 6. Ambition.
 7. Sociability.
 8. Imitativeness, Emulation, etc.
 9. Veracity, (desire for truth.)
 3. Psychological (Affections.)
 1. Malevolent, as Hatred.
 2. Benevolent, as Love.
 - 3. Conscience,** (or the Moral Impulse.)
- III. VOLITIONS,**
of which we say:
1. Their source is the *ego* in its highest sense—the true personality—the real *self*.
 2. Their characteristics are:
 1. They are *causes*, not effects.
 2. They are *free*, not necessitated.
 3. Processes leading to Volition are:
 1. Concepts of possible alternative acts.
 2. Motives for and against each.
 3. Choice by the Will—a free act.
 4. Executive volition—a free act.



CHAPTER XI.

CONCLUSION.

WE have now sketched all the processes of our soul-life from their incipiency in Sensation to their culmination in that highest of our soul-acts, Volition. We have traced all human effects to their ultimate cause and found the Will seated at the center of the soul directing its energies with God-given authority. This is, indeed, the true *ego*, the very core and essence of the soul. God willed, and material worlds sprang into being. Man wills, and worlds of thought and manifold forms of beauty and utility come forth at his fiat. Reason leads us to conclusions of incalculable value, but Reason exists because of the infirmity of our natures. God does not reason to his conclusions. He knows without debate. Reason is great. Will is God-like. Here, then, we take our stand and re-survey the field.

It has been necessary, in order to attain a clear view of our soul acts, to consider them as the product of distinct faculties and as succeeding each other in a definite order. But having thus separated and examined each element of our soul-life, it is now necessary to emphasize the fact that the soul is not thus consciously divided into separate parts, nor do its acts of intellection, emotion, and volition succeed each other at perceptible intervals of time. The soul is a unit and indivisible, and though we say Perception must logically come before Conception, Desire before Volition, yet in our daily life each moment brings a trooping train of Thoughts, Feelings, and Volitions inextricably intermingled, and apparently simultaneous. We are always thinking, always feeling, always willing. Sometimes one of these forms of soul-activity is

predominant at the expense of the others, but none are ever entirely shut out. When you are thinking intensely you do not feel things which at other times would affect you, but you do feel some things. When you give yourself up to emotion you do not and cannot examine closely, and if you criticise sharply you diminish emotion. In the heat of action man thinks and feels but little. First deliberation, then action, then enjoyment. Thought, Volition, and Feeling are successively predominant though all co-exist.

We invite you now to walk through this land of Spirits, bright, flitting Thoughts, beaming Emotions, and high-born Volitions by yourself. Your own soul lies open before you, enter its sacred precincts; "know thyself." If this brief outline shall contribute to exciting a more general interest in the great science of Psychology, or aid the sincere inquirer in its study, it will have accomplished the purpose of its author.

To refresh your mind after this rather dry dissertation, let me commend to you the following Traveler's Story, which will probably prove more interesting:

A TRAVELER'S STORY.

PSYCHE-LAND AND WHAT I SAW THERE.

I HAD lived for many years in Real-land, turning here and there in pursuit of knowledge or pleasure, when I was induced to attempt a voyage of discovery into a neighboring realm, of which I had heard something all my life, but with which I had never sought to become familiar. For, like many others, I had been deterred by the many reports of the difficulty of access, the peculiarities of language, and the haziness of atmosphere which were said to prevail in that kingdom, and to be a source of much embarrassment and perplexity to a stranger. With regard to these difficulties I will only say that while I found them not entirely imaginary, they yielded to a great degree before patient and persevering effort; and while many attractive things by reason of the haze eluded complete exploration, yet I left even these with a hope of a clearer view upon some subsequent visit, and returned from my voyage with the consciousness that though my curiosity had not been satisfied, it had been rewarded by some very beautiful and noble views, and had been directed to subjects whose further investigation promised much of instruction and delight.

Psyche-land, for such is the name of the country, attracts attention by the important part it plays in the affairs of the world, notwithstanding the insignificant dimensions of its own peculiar territory; but more especially is it interesting as being the realm of a sovereign of unique character and of peculiar relations to the King of Cosmos, usually called the Great King.

The soul, controlling only 150 pounds of matter, masters the earth, and is God's peculiar care.

It seems that many years ago the Great King took a certain very small district of Real-land, and having fitted it up in a most admirable manner with all kinds of conveniences for her especial use, installed a mysterious being named *Psyche*, a fairy-like goddess whom no profane eye has ever looked upon, as the ruler of the realm.

The body the
home of the
soul.

To her and to her kind, through all their generations, it was given to control this district, called *Body-land*, and through it to make such conquests as she might be able in the surrounding country. And wonderful is the dominion which she has thus established.

I had before explored to some extent this *Body-land* district, but now I determined to penetrate further—to enter the capital of the county, *Brain City* by name, and to seek admission to the palace of *Psyche* herself, that I might learn what I could of the organization and administration of her government, the officers of her court, and the rules and processes by which her affairs are conducted.

BODY-LAND.

The physical features of *Body-land* have been elaborately described by *Coming* and other investigators, and I need only refer to them here. Its shape, a long strip, bifurcated for the lower half part, and with two outlying strips of smaller size projecting from the upper portion of the central continent, and showing various other details of conformation and outline, is well known to all my readers. *Coming's* description of this country is wonderfully interesting, showing a development and a perfection surpassing any other district of *Real-land* of which we have knowledge. In particular the wondrous system of telegraphic communication by which every portion of her territory is brought into instantaneous intercourse with *Psyche* deserves our attention. The whole country is permeated with a net-work of telegraph lines centering in

Physiologists
tell of the
structure of
the body.

The nerves
and their uses.



SENSATION CIRCLE.
INTELLECTION HALL.

SENSIBILITY CORRIDOR.

WILL COURT.

Brain City. These lines not only automatically convey to Psyche notice of any assault from Real-land, or of the presence of any foreigner, but also keep her constantly informed of the attitude and disposition of all her own officers and subjects, and communicate her orders to them all. Besides the universal and minute general information thus acquired, there are five posts in Body-land provided with special and accurate instruments, though of different character at each, for observing and reporting by their private telegraph lines special movements in Real-land. These are called Taste Station, Touch Station, Sound Station, Smell Station, and Sight Observatory, which is situated in the highest part of the country, near Brain City, and has the instrument of greatest power and delicacy. There are no other means of communication with Psyche except through these telegraph lines.

The five senses tell us all we know of the outer world.

These numerous public and private telegraph lines all enter Brain City, the seat of Psyche's court, and terminate at *Sensation Circle*, the exterior boundary of her palace. All messages are in cipher, so that no one but Psyche's telegraph reader, Mr. Perception, can understand them.

Nerves give mere pulsations. Our minds understand them as color, sound, etc.

PSYCHE'S COURT.

When you enter Psyche's court you at once find yourself in a new and strange world, and one which it is difficult even to describe in the language of Real-land. Perhaps I may best give you an idea of its interior by the diagram of Brain City on opposite page.

Three different kinds of operations are performed in Psyche's court, and for convenience in examination we have assigned to them separate apartments. The first of these is

I. INTELLECTION HALL.

Here it is that all the facts and statistics about Real-land required in Psyche's court are gathered and digested for use.

Thought the basis of all mental action. It is bounded by Sensation Circle, and gathers there all the cipher telegrams from Real-land.

Some have reported that all that is in Intellectual Hall came originally from Real-land through Sensation Circle.

Innate ideas. But I must think otherwise. For when I surveyed this Hall, under the guidance of a Mr. Consciousness, who seemed a very reliable and well-informed person indeed, I noticed particularly some things which could not have come from Real-land. Some of these were things

which were not to be found in Real-land at all, or doctrines

Points, lines, etc., as defined mathematically, do not exist in fact. We cannot draw a line without breadth. which were not true in Real-land, but which were indisputable here. I will mention only such things as points, lines, angles, etc., and such statements as that the sum of the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Others

were what one has called the optical instruments through which the movements in Sensation Circle are viewed;

Concepts of Time, Space, Axioms of Math. standards of the Good and the Beautiful, etc. potentially innate. such as Substance, Time, Space, and Cause, while others are standards of measure by which the character and value of things reported to Psyche through Sensation Circle are determined, as "The True," "The Beautiful," "The Good," "The

Right."

I understand that Psyche's Sovereign gave her at least the pattern of these things and the capacity to make them when he put her in power, and that she formed them crudely the first time she had occasion for their use—probably in reading or testing some of the earliest telegraphic reports. They were, however, doubtless much improved, when I saw them, from their original form. That which appeared thus true in fact seems necessary in theory. For must not Psyche

have of herself instruments for receiving and examining, and standards for measuring the things of Real-land, by which their relation to her own so different realm may be determined?

The officers of Intellection Hall are :

PRESIDING OFFICER PRINCE REASON, Chief-Justice of Psyche's realm. Reason directs.

SUPERVISOR CONSCIOUSNESS, the best informed man in the kingdom, and a Sir Oracle as to its affairs. He is the highest authority in all questions as to the matters of Psyche-land. Consciousness knows.

INTERPRETER PERCEPTION, whose specific office it is to interpret the cipher telegraphic dispatches coming to Sensation Circle, and present them to the court. Mind reads a pulse in the optic nerves, as color, etc.

RECORDER MEMORY, who, as the general custodian of the records of Psyche's court, enters in a huge volume, marked *Experience*, all that occurs in Mr. Consciousness's presence. So systematic is Mr. Memory in his method of recording and indexing these almost innumerable items, that his two clerks, Messrs. Recollection and Remembrance, can, when properly stimulated to a performance of their duty, find the most minute records with wonderful facility. Memory can retain and recall all things.

ARTIST IMAGINATION holds a high rank, being ever ready to reproduce faithfully for Psyche's use any form or scene which Recollection or Remembrance may recite from the records of Memory, or to delight the court with creations of fancy of wonderful beauty. He pictures, also, the path of the future to Psyche, showing what possible acts Will may do, and portraying the consequences of each, and thus renders indispensable service to every department of Psyche's court. Imagination makes pictures of past and future.

COMMISSIONER JUDGMENT, the quiet, sober business man of the court, whom you may observe sitting by the record of

Experience, and measuring and weighing things brought to him by the standards which Psyche furnishes, and to which I have referred. You may hear him at any moment announcing his decisions—"True," "Beautiful," "Good," "Right," "Taller," etc.

All of the operations in Intellection Hall, and indeed throughout Psyche's palace, are performed with a promptness, celerity, and accuracy which are simply marvelous to one accustomed only to the slow-paced movements of Real-land. Telegrams from Body-land and Real-land come to Sensation Circle every second, and oftentimes in overwhelming crowds mingled together in what would seem inextricable confusion. But with wonderful quickness they are received and interpreted by Perception, assorted, abstracted, classified, compared, and labeled by Judgment, filed away for future reference by Memory, reproduced by Recollection or Remembrance, and again painted forth as before, or in new combinations and relations, by Imagination, while such cases as require action are forwarded, after being made up in Reason's court, to Will court for decision. While I was looking on, and in much less time than it takes to tell it, a telegram came from Eye Observatory which read, as well as I could make it out at Sensation Circle, "Round, yellowish, vanishingly shaded," etc., etc. "Orange," cried Perception

to the court, supplying a noun for all these adjectives, as he looked through the instrument used for such cases. "Good for food," declared Judgment, applying the standard of the Agreeable, whereupon Hunger, who was sleeping in the next corridor, and had a special telegraph line to Stomach Valley in Body-land, waked up and said "O!" and immediately started a quick and impulsive member of the bar of Will court, called Desire-for-Food, who, having the door invitingly opened by the page Hope, rushed into Will court and asked that

We judge of Beauty, etc., by our own standards.

Attributes only are perceived; the concept of substance in which they inhere is purely a mental creation.

Emotions only exclaim.

Desires move to action.

Deputy-Sheriff Hand be ordered to capture Orange from Real-land and bestow it on Stomach Valley; and although the method of procedure in Will court is quite complicated, as we shall presently see, and there were in this case several consultations with Reason court, and considerable argument between Mr. Desire-for-Food and Mr. Conscience, the Commonwealth's Attorney, the whole matter was settled and the orange was captured and bestowed, as Desire requested, within three seconds after the report from Eye Observatory was received; besides which proper attention was given to several minor matters during the same brief period.

We see, desire, decide, and act about an object almost instantaneously and while doing other things also.

II. SENSIBILITY CORRIDOR.

Sensibility Corridor is the lobby (see diagram) where clients or their representatives meet the attorneys who practice at the bar of Will court. As the affairs both of Body-land and of Psyche's court are regulated by Sir Will's decisions, these each have representatives in Sensibility Corridor to tell of their condition and needs, and special attorneys to plead the cases of each in Will court. But as Sensation Circle is peculiarly situated, partaking of the nature of Body-land as well as of Real-land, there seems to be a necessity for a third class of representatives and attorneys to attend to these special interests. And so we find in Sensibility Corridor representatives of three classes of clients and three corresponding classes of attorneys. The representatives of clients are known as Emotions, while the attorneys constitute the very ancient and numerous family of Desires, which has secured for itself the monopoly of the legal profession in Psyche-land.

Emotions and Desires are each physical, physio-psychical and psychological.

Among the Body-land group of Emotions I noticed especially gaunt HUNGER, withered THIRST, tottering WEAKNESS, and bounding VITALITY. Their attending attorneys were a branch of the Desire family known

Physical emotions and desires.

as Appetites, as clamorous and importunate a crew as ever bothered a witness or badgered a jury. I must note also the presence among this group of some evidently foreign and, it is reported, illegitimate members of the family, who having gotten in by hook or by crook, and been admitted to the privileges of the Desire family as pleaders at the bar of Will court, not only make themselves as much at home as any, but are actually more domineering, clamorous, and importunate than those born in the household. I will name especially LIQUOR-CRAVING and TOBACCO-CRY.

The representatives of Sensation Circle were of a less conspicuous dress and more sedate demeanor. They constitute the second group of the Emotion family, and I noted only sprightly CHEERFULNESS, sad-faced MELANCHOLY, care-worn ANXIETY, stolid INDIFFERENCE, lively INTEREST, and languid ENNUI.

The members of the Desire family which give especial attention to cases from Sensation Circle are called Propensities, some of which incline to favor Psyche in these complex cases, and others are more considerate of Body-land and of Real-land beyond. Among the former I was interested in observing one CURIOSITY, who peered around equipped with a magnifying glass and a bunch of skeleton keys, ACQUISITIVENESS, with an iron chest, and AMBITION, who seemed to be ever clutching after an imaginary scepter. The latter and more liberal-minded section embraced such well-known friends of Real-land as scrupulous IMITATIVENESS, politic APPROBATIVE-NESS, and VERACITY, a most engaging youth of frank, open face and clear and steady eye.

Among the representatives of Psyche's court on the Emotion side of the corridor are sad-faced SORROW, scornful CONTEMPT, cankerous ENVY, green-eyed JEALOUSY, and dark-browed, scowling HATE on the one hand, and on the other adoring REVERENCE, bright-faced GRATI-

TUDE, ADMIRATION, with parted lips, quiet ESTEEM, and queen among them all, LOVE, a maiden so entrancing that words fail to express her beauty and worth. It is said, indeed, that she is related to the Great King, a princess by birth, and that to educate her thoroughly and to establish her influence over Psyche is an object of great importance to him.

The attorneys who represent Psyche-land in Will court are the ablest at the bar, and those which are employed by the well-favored Emotions are of imposing presence and lofty eloquence. I mention only Mr. PATRIOTISM, Mr. BENEVOLENCE, and Mr. PIETY, whose pleadings have been known to lead Sir Will to deeds with which the world has rung—deeds such as made Leonidas, Florence Nightingale, and Paul immortal names.

Love is to rule the Soul

Psychical Desires.

Love of Country, Man, and God.

Three other personages attracted my attention, as of different dispositions from any I have named. Two of these, named HOPE and FEAR, are usually seen in company and yet opposed. As they have no cases of their own, these briefless barristers meddled in nearly all the cases which came up, attaching themselves to the more fortunate attorneys retained, either to assist or oppose. Hope seemed to think it his business to open the door into Will court, and encourage the presentation of the plea, while Fear as persistently retarded all such movements.

The third was a personage of dignified and commanding bearing, as if conscious of his noble ancestry, for he is a prince of the blood. He stood almost alone, for though his smile or frown contributes much to the comfort or disquiet of the rest, he has but one intimate companion. To him he is inseparably attached, and his cases he watches with ready sympathy, applauding his success and indignant at any decision of Sir Will against him. It is Mr. MORAL EMOTION to whom I refer, and his friend is Mr. Conscience, the Commonwealth's Attorney.

Moral Emotion accompanies every conscientious volition.

The atmosphere of Sensibility Corridor must resemble that of the enchanted land, for all its inhabitants lie asleep or nodding—the Emotions waiting to be aroused by messages through the wires, and the Desires, lawyer-like, waiting for cases from clients, (which generally, if not always, come through the Emotions,) or collecting fees from them. The coin paid by the Emotions seemed to be of three kinds, corresponding to our copper, silver, and gold—*Satisfactions*, with which the appetites were paid off; *Pleasures*, which settled the salary of the higher-priced Propensities; and *Happiness*, the gold of Psyche-land. Of this the largest coins, a solid and weighty one called *Peace*, and a bright, shining one called *Joy*, seemed rewards worthy of the highest efforts of Messrs. Patriotism, Benevolence, and Piety.

But these excitable Emotions, though they easily fall asleep, are very quickly wide-awake when any thing which concerns them is clicked over the wires. They will jump up in a second and cry “O!” “Ah!” “Hurrah!” and start a nimble attorney off with a case, though but a moment before you might have thought them sound asleep, or even dead. They are withal the only inhabitants of Psyche-land who seem really to be enjoying themselves, for while the rest are busily employed these do nothing else than stimulate them to work and reward them for it, and every officer in Psyche-land, from Sir Will down, seems to be delighted to rouse them and listen to their expressions. To hear the “hurrah” of Vitality, the “ah!” of Interest, the low-voiced murmur of Love, and the emphatic “well done” of Moral Approbation, are objects which Intellection Hall and Will court unite to attain, while the clink of the coin of the realm—satisfaction, pleasure, and happiness—is charming to Psyche’s ears.

Above them all, radiant with royal beauty, is the Princess Love. Less reticent or exclusive than her brother, the

Feelings and desires only aroused by circumstances.

Desires based on antecedent Emotions.

To feel, is the object of all effort.

princely friend of Conscience, she smiles on all, and when her face beams with the royal light which betokens her origin, it fills all Psyche-land with heavenly radiance.

We shall see more of our friends, the Desire family, now as we pass into Will court, where Prime Minister Will, clothed with all her authority, guides the affairs of Psyche's domain, and determines her fate and fortunes.

III. WILL COURT.

The jurisdiction of this court extends to the entire realm of Body-land, and its authority is recognized and its orders obeyed by all the loyal officers of the palace also, so that all the movements of both presumably originate with it. SIR WILL is hence the responsible head of Psyche's realm. But with regard to small details of customary cases, subordinate officers seem often to act in accordance with previous decisions of court, and apparently without referring to it for instructions. Moreover, I must say that the government of Psyche is not as perfect as it should be, and that some of the stronger members of the Desire family, nicknamed "Passions," and the less sober officers, as Mr. Imagination, do not seem to be very well under Sir Will's control, nor very obedient to his orders, and he, himself, though perhaps able ultimately to subdue them, does not always insist upon his rights and compel obedience to his orders, but often modifies those orders and swerves from the strict line of right and justice and the highest good, to meet the caprices or appease the complaints of these rebellious subjects.

Not only has Will court, or rather SIR WILL, (for there is no jury,) supreme jurisdiction as indicated, but his decisions are final in their sphere, and are only subject to revision by the King's Supreme Court of Inquiry, at whose single session the entire record of the court will be examined, not with a view to reverse or alter

Reflex motor
nerve action
non-voluntary.

Acts of Will
to be reviewed
at the day
of Judgment.

its action, but to determine Psyche's standing with the King as a "good and faithful" viceroy.

OFFICERS OF WILL COURT.

The officers of Will court are :

1. SIR WILLIAM WILL, Prime Minister of Psyche. His acts are recognized as Psyche's, and for them and their consequences, and these alone, Psyche, as viceroy, is held responsible to the King. The justice of this will appear when you know that Psyche has, under the laws of the King, the power to determine the character of this chief officer. The duty of this officer is to decide all propositions for action which may be brought before him, and to issue all necessary orders to secure the action determined upon.

2. The next officer is COUNSELOR CONSCIENCE, the Commonwealth's Attorney, whose special and *only* duty it is to demand and insist that the court shall decide all questions according to the facts in the case and the laws of the King, as such facts and laws are certified to the court of Will by Prince Reason, who presides in Intellection Hall, and to protest and give notice of appeal to the King's Court of Inquiry in all cases of adverse decisions, while his bosom companion, Mr. Moral Emotion, always agreeing with his friend, publishes his satisfaction or dissatisfaction at the action of Sir Will in these cases. This assurance of approval or disapproval, coming from so august a personage as Counselor Conscience's inseparable companion, is not only in itself very pleasant or unpleasant to Psyche, as the case may be, but together with his own protest is regarded as an important indication of the probable action of the King's Court of Inquiry, to which she may very naturally look forward with intense concern. For it must be observed that Counselor Conscience, being Commonwealth's Attorney, is the

Renewed
wills offered
through
Christ.

Knowledge of
the right is an
Intellection;
a p p r o b a t i o n
of a right act
an Emotion;
t h e d e m a n d
that the right
be done is the
true voice of
Conscience.

representative of the Crown, and is supposed to reflect the wishes and demands of the King. This is the reason, I suppose, why he bears himself so haughtily, and dictates to Sir Will so imperiously, and sometimes goes to great lengths in his reproaches and upbraidings, especially after having been stimulated to the more zealous discharge of his duty by one of the communications from the King which he is frequently receiving through messengers. But I am sorry to say, that he often becomes very remiss, and if very often crossed by Sir Will in any class of cases, will cease to prosecute such cases, or to protest and appeal, as it is his duty to continue to do. Yet, even in such cases of indifference to duty, or in the yet more lamentable death-like stupor into which he has been known to fall from frequent ill-treatment, he is often aroused by messages from the King, and though he can do no more, protests most vigorously, and threatens Psyche with the condemnation and wrath of her Sovereign.

Conscience
deadened;
stirred by the
Holy Spirit.

In the discharge of his duty it is incumbent upon Counselor Conscience to require of Sir Will that he render no decision without having caused a careful examination into the facts and law affecting the case to have been made in Intellection Hall, and to protest in case such examination is omitted.

Conscience
requires us to
seek truth.

Perhaps I have been too hard on Mr. Conscience for his frequent neglect of duty, considering the treatment to which he is subjected by the arbitrary Sir Will, who is, as you may judge, no great friend to such unservile attendant. What with his frequent cruelties and the ill effects of similar ill-treatment of his ancestors for generations past, Mr. Conscience's health is never perfect, and often very poor indeed, so that we must lay most or all of his sins at last at Sir Will's door. Recognizing the situation of Mr. Conscience, the King's law has declared that Psyche will be held responsible for any injury done to the

Conscience
weakened by
past sins.

Commonwealth's Attorney by her Premier, and in case stupor or other insensibility is produced by his action so that Mr. Conscience cannot efficiently discharge his duties, she is held responsible for all acts contrary to the law, just as if Conscience had protested. Sir Will is so very headstrong, however, and withal so prone to heed the suggestions of the aforementioned Passions, great enemies of Chief-Justice Reason and very intolerant of Mr. Conscience, that the latter nearly always bears marks of ill-usage, and is far less nimble than he should be. Favorable decisions, however, greatly improve him, and frequent communications from the King stimulate his zeal and activity. When he is in his best health, he is very dictatorial and exacting, and yet, when Sir Will is guided by his claims in all decisions, it is admitted by all observers, and Psyche herself, that things go best in Psyche-land.

But even under these most favorable circumstances there is another great difficulty to obtaining correct decisions in Will court. For Prince Reason, who ascertains and certifies to Will court the law as well as the facts, very often makes sad mistakes about both—woefully mistaking the law through prejudice or ignorance, and also often misjudging the facts. Against this, Will court has no remedy, except what may be secured by requiring of Reason a more careful investigation; but let Reason do what he may, he finds it impossible, without help directly from the King, to give a perfectly correct statement of the law in all cases brought before him.

This sad state of affairs, it is stated on the best of authority, has not always existed; for at first Reason could see and perfectly apply the law, at which time Sir Will was in such perfect accord with Chief-Justice Reason that he always decided at once in accordance with his statements, and Mr. Conscience had nothing to do. It is said, indeed, that at that time the King himself was in daily

Conscience
the best
guide.

Reason im-
perfect.

Effects of the
Fall.

communication with Psyche, and some say that only since that was interrupted—owing to her misconduct—has Mr. Conscience been installed as his active, actual representative. But in a great disaster which befell Psyche-land and Body-land, too, a long while ago, (I believe it was brought on by Psyche's transgressing the orders of the King, which disobedience was also the cause of the King's alienation,) Chief-Justice Reason and his attendants, Messrs. Judgment and others, along with all the officers of Psyche, were very seriously injured, and to this the blindness and other infirmities of Reason are to be attributed. It is, however, announced in the royal law, (Vol. III, Part II, *passim*,) that the Great Physician has prepared an eye-salve, called "Balm of Gilead," which Psyche may have application, and which will remedy the defects of Reason in reading the law; and it is further declared, that if this remedy is faithfully used Psyche will be forgiven for errors arising from any misjudgment of Reason.

Knowledge of
Good and Evil
only after the
Fall.

God's will
revealed in
Nature, Vol.
I, Man, Vol.
II, Bible,
Vol. III.

Forgiveness
through
Christ.

It was necessary, however, that reparation should be made to the King for the injuries already resulting from such errors and for other offenses, which would have left Psyche in a very distressing state (since she could not possibly have paid the penalty) had it not been for the unexampled generosity of the King's Son, who, feeling the deepest interest in Psyche, took her whole indebtedness upon himself, and at an inconceivable sacrifice and with incredible labor and suffering, not only paid all past demands in full, but deposited abundant resources to meet all similar penalties which she might incur in future, the whole being conditioned upon her acceptance of the King's laws and personal devotion to the King and his Son.

Redemption.

I must add that the King often sends his special interpreter to make plain the law, and that this helper sometimes

reads the law, even when the eye-salve is not used, and Holy Spirit convinces of sin. reads it so loudly too, that it sets Mr. Conscience agog, and creates a great commotion in Psyche-land generally.

For the general injury to Psyche as well as to Body-land from the memorable disaster before referred to, there is no present remedy; none in fact, until the King Restoration through Christ. comes to settle up affairs; but the damages resulting to Body-land from Psyche's mistakes will ultimately all be repaired, while the very difficulties which beset her are turned to good account by the great Friend who has undertaken her cause. His tender affection for Psyche is well known, and rumors of a contemplated marriage The "Marriage of the Lamb." even are currently reported to have originated in expressions of the Prince himself, the grand event to take place when Psyche shall have been rescued from all her difficulties and infirmities.

This digression into the history and relations of Psyche has seemed to me necessary to render intelligible the mixture of qualities and conflict of efforts among the officers of Psyche's court.

3. The remaining officers require but brief notice. The records of Psyche's court, in all the departments, are intrusted to RECORDER MEMORY, whose functions have been already described. The decisions of Sir Will are, however, also recorded in a separate book marked "*Character*," and this book it is, which will be examined by the King's Court of Inquiry, at least so much of it as shall not have been changed or blotted out by the Prince, according to his provision and law. SHERIFF MUSCLE, who executes the tele-Muscle guided by brain conquer Nature.graphic orders of Sir Will to Body-land, is always within call, though never in court, being an inhabitant of Body-land, and through him and the portions of Body-land which he summons to his aid, Psyche makes the most wonderful conquests in Real-land, especially

when Sir Will and Chief-Justice Reason are in harmony, so that the latter is allowed to supervise and direct the action of the sheriff and his posse. Of the dexterity and promptness of these I might tell some wonderful tales, but I forbear.

The attorneys practicing at the bar of Will court, besides Commonwealth's Attorney Conscience, are all members of the Desire family, native or adopted, and have been sufficiently described in our observations on Sensibility Corridor. These are all advocates of the *Agreeable*, while Conscience is ever the upholder of *Law*, which is the declaration of the *Right*. The many contests between them are probably due to the general disturbance noted before; for I find

it laid down in the Constitution of Psyche-land Man originally perfect.

that Conscience alone shall be allowed to plead on questions in which the statute law of the King is involved, Desires being debarred from all Conscience cases. The chief function with which they were originally intrusted seems to have been to present cases to the court and move it to action, and before the disturbance occurred they had always moved in harmony with Reason and with the King's will, but I am told that it was chiefly through their impetuosity that

Will was moved to the act which cost Psyche so dear. Were it not for the majesty and authority Appetite and Ambition ruined man.

of Mr. Conscience, and the consequence which his position as the King's representative gives him, his voice would probably be drowned in the clamor of these numerous and impetuous advocates.

I was much gratified to find that the King's Son has undertaken to end the hostilities between this Desire family and Mr. Conscience, either by inducing them to submit to his authority or by expelling them from Psyche-land. But the plan adopted requires Sir

Will's hearty co-operation, and as he has become quite attached to some of those who might have to leave, the happy consummation seems to be slowly approached, and Con- Desire to be made subject to Conscience.

science has to struggle on with the majority of the Desires against him. These, then, constitute the bar.

MODE OF PROCEDURE.

Many sorts of cases are made up in Reason's court for Will to act upon, but none can come before him except upon the motion of one of these licensed attorneys. The work of Reason in preparing a case for Will court is about as follows: 1. Interpreter Perception shows certain facts. 2. Commissioner Judgment ascertains their relations. 3. Artist Imagination suggests new combinations, and pictures two or more possible actions which Will may take. 4. These "*Concepts of Possible Action,*" drawn up by Imagination, are referred to Commissioner Judgment for measurement by the three standards which he possesses for that purpose, which are called The Right, The Useful, The Perfect. Reason then indorses upon each of these "*Concepts*" the decisions of Judgment as to its relation to the three standards named, and the carefulness of its investigations being certified, the case is finally ready for presentation in Will court.

When these alternative "*Concepts*" are taken up by different members of the Desire family, and their contrary views are urged upon the court, Sir Will is sometimes hard put to it to decide. In many of these cases Conscience seems to take but little if any interest, either because of its own remissness or because Reason has not reported any positive decision as to the relation of the act to The Right, owing to the imperfections previously mentioned as existing in its operations.

I should add, as an interesting fact, that Psyche herself has a telescope called "*Faith,*" by which, in clear weather, she can see the signals from the King's palace, and that thus she often solves problems too deep for

No volition
without mo-
tive.

Alternatives
always before
choice.

Of a course
proposed we
ask, "Is it
right, is it
profitable, is
it becoming?"

Some acts not
apparently
moral.

Faith tran-
scends Rea-
son.

Reason. Skill in the use of this instrument, accompanied by signals of distress and need, is known to lead to very great and valuable results. Prayer brings aid.

TWO DISPUTED POINTS.

Several very important questions have been discussed by observers of the action of Will court, about two of which I will give the conclusions to which my observation and investigations have led me.

First, it has been held that Sir Will, though apparently free and arbitrary in his actions, is really the servant or the puppet of the various attorneys which practice at the bar of this court, as described, and in proof of this three arguments are presented: First, that he never acts except at the suggestion of one or more of these Attorneys or Motives, by which name the whole of these pleaders may be designated. Secondly, that he always does decide in accordance with the one which makes the strongest appeal, and hence it is argued he is "controlled by the strongest Motive," as they phrase it. Thirdly, that the decisions of Will in given cases, where the motives are known, can be forecast with much certainty, as, for instance, that a ripe orange belonging to Psyche's domain, will, at the request of Desire-for-food, Messrs. Reason and Conscience consenting, be bestowed upon Stomach Valley, showing that Sir Will is really controlled by Motives, so that knowing the motives we can often foretell the decision.

But if I saw Sir Will aright, as seated upon the bench of a court deciding cases, it will be seen at once that it can very readily be admitted that he can take no action until Motives, the attorneys at his bar, bring forward a case for decision, and yet in his decision express only his own views and wishes. He cannot, it is true, decide unless he has something to decide; but that fact does not cause him to decide either one way or the other. Freedom of the will.
Will, determined by Motives.
Motives the occasions, not the causes, of volitions.
Motives

thus are the occasions, the indispensable conditions, without which there would be no action at all, but they do not control or determine Sir Will's decisions.

The second assertion, that he always decides in accordance with the strongest motive, is both questionable as a fact, and it seems to me a "begging of the question" as an argument. I have seen Sir Will decide directly contrary to his own previous decisions on the same subject, when not a single new motive appeared to account for the change, and I have seen him decide against every plea which I perceived to be advanced by Motives, and act contrary to all, apparently just to assert and show his independence.

But though it were claimed and conceded that this desire for independence is here the strongest Motive, yet it is apparent that a Motive has strength only as it *pleases Will*; an appeal that suits him, is strong; one that does not, is weak; and to say that he acts with the strongest, is simply to say he acts the way that suits him best.

The third argument leads *toward* a proof, but does not lead *to* one. For though we can *often* we cannot *always* predict the decisions of Will where all the Motives in the case are known, and if it were true that motives *determine* Will's decisions, we ought, when the case is known, to be able *always*, not sometimes only, to predict the decision upon it, and the same case would necessarily always be decided the same way, which we find is not done. So it is plain this argument does not hold good. I think the fact that Will's decisions are often able to be predicted, is readily accounted for when we remember that, like most other judges, he is *apt* to follow his own precedents; and if we have observed his decisions closely, so as to know his views and peculiar tendencies, we can make a fair calculation as to his action in similar cases to those observed. But it is a matter of fact that we are often greatly disappointed in such calculations, because Sir Will turns round and violates all his own prece-

dents, doing things which he never did before under the same circumstances. Hence he is very uncertain.

That Will is the master, not the servant, of Motives, seems to me to be indicated by the fact that as judge he has the power to disbar any of the Motives, to refuse to listen to their appeals, and to stop the wrangling in any case and adjourn its decision to a future time, although We can refuse attention to Motives. Desires all clamor for gratification. He can and often does refuse attention even to the facts and law as furnished by Reason and to the demands of Conscience, so that his actions, as far as I could see, are entirely self-originated.

I asked Chief-Justice Reason what he thought of Sir Will's freedom in his action, and he replied that if Psyche's Prime Minister was not free then all the acts of the kingdom were forced upon her, and he could not for the life of him see what was the use of his court having all Revelation of duty useless without freedom. the laws in those three big books to study and explain, in order to show Will what he ought to do, if he was not free to do it when told. He added, moreover, that Commissioner Judgment declared it monstrous to say that Psyche was held responsible by the King, and liable to punishments for the acts of Sir Will, if those acts were controlled by any outside parties without her knowledge or consent.

As we were discussing the question, Mr. Consciousness (who is the Sir Oracle of Psyche) came up, to whom we willingly referred the matter for decision, whereupon, in his own emphatic way, and without "if" or "but," he said Free Will a dictum of Consciousness. that he knew of his own personal knowledge, and had known it from infancy—in fact, ever since he had known any thing—that Sir Will was absolutely free and arbitrary in his decisions, a statement which ended, with us, the discussion.

"You will note, however," continued Mr. Consciousness, "that Sir Will by his decisions weaves for himself, to speak in a figure, the garment of habit; ("for," remarked he quite

facetiously, "since every coat is a habit, may not habit be called a coat;") weaves then this Habit, which, though in its earlier stages it is very flexible, comes to fit very tightly and to be very stiff and unyielding, so as to be much in Sir Will's way; and though he may have or may acquire the power to tear it asunder at any stage and go out of the range of movement allowed by it, yet as a fact he does not very often do so; so that if we observe closely the pattern and make of this garment as it is being woven, we may judge with great accuracy of the general character and limitations of Sir Will's subsequent acts. "O!" said he, becoming quite serious and earnest, "it is a very, very important thing, the pattern of that garment."

The second point upon which I would definitely express and reiterate an opinion which I have incidentally indicated already is this: By many if not by most explorers, Conscience has been thought to be possessed of the capacity to read the books of law for himself, and to make up his own cases, as well as argue them in Will court; many going on to say that his decisions as to the right and wrong of an act (that is its conformity or non-conformity to the law) echo the voice of the King himself. But I am persuaded that Prince Reason is the decider of all questions in Psyche-land which require comparison. That the standard of Right is in the keeping of that court, as are the standards of The True and The Good, and indeed all others with which Psyche is supplied, and that the question whether this or that act is right, is decided by the same officer who decides that this or that conception is beautiful, this or that act profitable. I find that these decisions of Reason's court are made the basis of Counselor Conscience's appeals, and that he never advocates that which Mr. Reason condemns as wrong, and always demands of Will to do that which is by him certified as right. Hence it is that we can explain the many erroneous things which Conscience leads

The term
"Conscience"
limited to the
Imperative
"do what
Reason says
is right."

Will to do, as arising from the wrong information as to what is right given him by Reason court, which error preceeds from the same infirmity of Reason noticed before as leading to so many mistakes in his other decisions, as to the true, the expedient, etc. To say that Counselor Conscience decides as to the rightness of individual acts, and then to affirm that this decision is the voice of the King, is to make the King responsible for many very contradictory definitions of right and wrong. I find that the whole function of Conscience is to urge Will, in the name and by the authority of the King, to do what Prince Reason has certified as right, and that Mr. Moral Emotion which attends him always expresses his views to Psyche when Prime Minister Will's decisions are or are not in accordance with the right *as Reason states it*, and that, too, regardless of any mistake which may afterward be discovered to have been made by Reason. Will is commended for his conformity to the right as determined by Reason *at the time*, and this commendation is never afterward withdrawn.

Conscientious
wrong-doing
due to the in-
firmity of
Reason.

That this does not provide for perfect action in Psyche-land is admitted, and hence the necessity for the eye-salve and other remedies provided by the Prince as mentioned heretofore.

Of the King's Court of Inquiry I could ascertain but little from Psyche's officers. They seemed, however, to feel that its scrutiny would be unbearable but for the friendship of the King's Son and the work which he has done; that it will only review the Conscience cases in Will's record, that is, those in which the law was involved, though some do say, and with great show of reason, that every act of Will is a Conscience case, claiming that the law has to do with all his decisions. Psyche believes that judgment will be given on Sir Will's action according to the facts before him in each case, and his care in requiring Reason to ascertain all the facts possible before

The Judg-
ment.

Responsibili-
ty according
to light.

he decides a case; and that where the last volume of the law has not been placed before Reason, the case will be decided according to the laws written in Volumes I and II, a view which seems authorized by Volume III itself. (Rom. ii, 12-15.)

A CASE TRIED AND DECIDED.

I will conclude by describing the conduct of a case which originated and was decided in my presence, that you may gather up this long description of Psyche-land in a single example of the operations of its court.

Perceiving a stir in Sensation Circle, I looked and saw a message from Ear-gate, "vibration, k, l, 30,000, do. 3,000, do. 21,000, shhhs, pop," etc., etc., etc. "Sound of something bursting," quickly cried Perception, for he knew how to read Ear-gate's cipher. But just as he said this there came a telegram from Eye-tower: "Shooting, up, up, up, flash, people." I could make nothing out of it until astute Perception said: "Another message about the same thing—people sending up fire-works." Then followed, under the supervision of Reason, a deal of rapid calculation and work of various sorts by Judgment, Recollection, Imagination, and others in Intellection Hall, and very quickly Consciousness, looking at a paper upon which Imagination had drawn a few rapid strokes, called out "Concept of self united with people looking on." Thereupon Excitement started up on the emotion side of Sensibility Corridor, and looking at the "concept" nudged Mr. Desire-to-see, on the other side, who being awakened, seized the paper, and rushing into Will court with it, asked for an immediate order on Sheriff Muscle to move Body-land toward the fire-works. Thereupon Mr. Conscience, who was much more sedate in his movements, arose and asked whether Mr. Desire-to-see had brought into court all the facts and the law in the case from Reason court. Mr. Desire-to-see had to confess that he had been in such a hurry that he had run off with the "Concept of self united with


people looking on," drawn by Imagination, before Reason had indorsed her statement of the law and facts upon it. The brief having been returned for these, came back with the following indorsements: 1. *Facts and Judgment*—(1.) To see will be pleasant, enlivening, beneficial to body if not continued too long. (2.) Lessons to be prepared leave only one hour for amusement. (3.) This concept is not contrary to the Law.

Upon this statement of the facts and law, Desire-to-see renewed his appeal, claiming that the action he desired was in accordance with the facts and the law, as stated by Reason, and that even his old opponent, Mr. Conscience, could surely find nothing to say against it. Whereupon, Mr. Conscience, congratulating Mr. Desire-to-see upon *happening* to be on good ground, and twitting him with having taken his side before he knew Reason's decision, said that he had no objection to the proposed action, and indeed would join with his facile friend in urging it, unless Reason could suggest some better occupation for the hour, upon which point he insisted that Reason should be again consulted. This was done, to the great apprehension of Mr. Desire-to-see, but Reason not suggesting any thing better, Conscience and Desire both rested the case, the former only saying that he should insist on the order being strictly in accordance with the facts, that Sheriff Muscle should carry body to the spot, and after *one hour's* amusement, should return it to other duty. Desire-to-see did not seem to like this particularity of Mr. Conscience, but well knowing that Reason would be against him if he referred to him the question of return, he submitted. Sir Will, after a moment's hesitation, decided the question in favor of the proposition as stated by Mr. Conscience, which started Moral Approval, Anticipation-of-Pleasure, and other Emotions to animation in the adjoining corridor. An order was at once issued by telegraph to Sheriff Muscle, and in a moment more he was hurrying body off toward the throng. Whether he

brought it back at the appointed time I cannot say, but I noticed a sly smile on Desire-to-see's face which made me think he hoped to trick old Mr. Conscience yet, and at least expected to get Sir Will to re-open the question of return at a more auspicious moment. At any rate Consciousness reported the whole transaction to Memory, and it was recorded in "the Book of the Acts of Will" and went to make up the volume of "Character," and a thread was woven in the garment of Habit.

And so every day and hour is the book of our character, and the Habit which shall fit around our Will being completed, and his decisions being entered up for adjudication at the great day of Accounts.

THE END.






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